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violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
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Is the Constitution colorblind? Should preferential treatment for mi-
norities be construed to violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? If preferential
treatment is permissible, which groups should be favored? These funda-
mental questions about the meaning of equality remain shrouded in
controversy and confusion despite, or perhaps because of, recent Su-
preme Court decisions and the rapidly burgeoning body of commentary
on the cases, both in the popular press' and legal literature.2 At the
heart of the confusion is the simple fact that the Supreme Court has
been unable to develop a coherent rationale for its decisions approving
affirmative action .3 What is worse, the fragmentation of the Court-
witness its six separate opinions in the Bakke case-has worked
against the attainment of doctrinal clarity.4 The Court has simply
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. The author acknowledges the
able assistance of Professor Michael Burns and of Ms. Melanie May in critiquing the
various drafts of this paper.
I. Commenting upon the confusion, Thurgood Marshall humorously observed:
"I have seen so many interpretations of our decision [Bakke] now that it's hard for me
to distinguish between what we actually wrote and what the press says we wrote."
Address by Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall at the Second Circuit Judicial Con-
ference (September 8, 1978), 82 F.R.D. 221, 224 (1978).
2. The pages of the Index to Legal Periodicals continue to offer an apparently
inexhaustible supply of articles on various aspects of the preferential treatment debate.
A number of articles is cited in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288, n.25 (1978).
3. The origin of the term "affirmative action" has been traced to Executive Or-
der No. 10925 issued by President Kennedy. In bureaucratic practice, it usually means
(I) not discriminating against minorities, (2) advertising equal opportunity, and (3)
making special efforts to recruit qualified minorities by outreach and special training
programs. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 46 (1975). Most commentators use
"affirmative action" interchangeably with benign or reverse discrimination to describe
preferential treatment for minorities because of minority status.
4. Several commentators have expressed this view. "The Bakke opinions ...
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failed to provide the authoritative guidance needed in order to facili-
tate the difficult task of reconciling the demands of racial justice and
the commands of equal treatment under the law.
The purpose of this article is to make a contribution to an under-
standing of the issue of preferential treatment for minorities by (1) re-
viewing the embryonic legal doctrine that has emerged in De Funis,
Bakke, Weber and the pending' Kreps case; (2) arguing that American
political and constitutional history, from slavery to segregation to the
present, requires recognition of the unique status of Blacks in our legal
system; and (3) concluding that affirmative action for Blacks for some
indefinite period of time is a legitimate and neutral constitutional prin-
ciple which ought to be adopted by the Supreme Court as the ratio
decidendi of future reverse discrimination cases.
I. REVIEW OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. De Funis
The question of the validity of race-conscious programs has been
presented to the United States Supreme Court four times. In the first
case, De Funis v. Odegaard, an unsuccessful white applicant to the
University of Washington Law School claimed the law school had dis-
criminated against him because of his race by admitting several minor-
ity applicants with lower grades and test scores. The Supreme Court of
Washington rejected De Funis' claim; but because he had been admit-
ted to school pendente lite and was about to graduate, the United
States Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, dismissed his claim as
moot.7
have complicated rather than simplified both benign discrimination and the under-
standing of the equal protection clause." Stone, Equal Protection in Special Admis-
sions Programs: Forward from Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 719, 742 (1979).
"Bakke settles so little that it is virtually useless as a precedent." Morris, The Bakke
Decision: One Holding or Two?, 58 OR. L. REv. 311, 334 (1979).
5. Kreps was argued before the Supreme Court on November 27, 1979, but has
not been decided as this article goes to the printer. 48 U.S.L.W. 3365-67 (Dec. 4,
1979).
6. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
7. Justice Douglas issued a lengthy dissent, arguing that the case was not moot
and that the minority admissions program was discriminatory because of its two-track
admissions process by which Blacks, Chicanos, American Indians and Filipinos re-
2
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B. Bakke
The issue of preferential treatment next arose in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,a a prolific source of law review com-
mentary.9 In Bakke, the California Supreme Court invalidated a proce-
dure whereby sixteen of one hundred seats in the entering medical
school class were set aside for a special admissions process employing
less stringent standards than those for non-minority applicants apply-
ing for the remaining eighty-four seats. Alan Bakke, a white applicant,
had applied to the University of California at Davis Medical School in
1973 and 1974 and was rejected both times. In both years, minority
applicants were admitted under the special program with grades and
test scores "significantly lower" than Bakke's."0 In addition, the minor-
ity applicants could compete for all one hundred places in the entering
class, while non-minority applicants were restricted to competing for
only eighty-four places.
Demonstrating clear antipathy for "a line drawn on the basis of
race and ethnic status,""1 Justice Powell's one-man "opinion of the
Court" rejected the concept of benign discrimination" and asserted
that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination. '"' In order to
pass constitutional muster, therefore, the Davis special admissions pro-
gram would have to be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ceived preference. He concluded that "[t]here is no constitutional right for any race to
be preferred." Id. at 336.
Despite the mootness ruling, De Funis is not without significance in terms of the
development of reverse discrimination doctrine because the Douglas dissent is relied
upon by Mr. Justice Powell in Bakke. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Symposium: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1979).
10. 438 U.S. at 277. The issue of qualifications is confused by the fact that other
non-minority applicants with higher scores than Bakke were also rejected. Addition-
ally, Bakke's age was a factor considered by the admissions committee; he was 33 at
the time of his second application. The implications of Alan Bakke's ambiguous posi-
tion relative to other applicants is creatively explored in Smith, The Road Not Taken:
More Reflections on the Bakke Case, 5 S. U.L. REV. 23, 58-60 (1978).
11. 438 U.S. at 289.
12. Id. at 294-95.
13. Id. at 291.
1 4:1980 Beyond Reverse Discrimination 65 1
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ernmental interest." 1' 4
Justice Powell agreed that the admission of a diverse student body
was a compelling governmental interest. 5 Nevertheless, the particular
two-track procedure used by Davis was held unconstitutional because it
was not necessary to the attainment of racial and ethnic diversity in
light of the alternative means available. Justice Powell reasoned that
race could be considered-that race could be given a "plus" to "tip the
balance" in favor of an otherwise qualified minority applicant"6-so
long as majority group applicants were not automatically foreclosed
from consideration for any of the available seats. 7 Thus, as an example
of a constitutionally acceptable alternative means by which to attain
ethnic diversity, Powell placed his imprimatur on the Harvard College
Admissions Program, attaching it as an Appendix"8 to his opinion.
Justice Powell concluded by affirming that portion of the order of
the California Supreme Court ordering Bakke's admission to the medi-
cal school. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist, agreed that Alan Bakke had been the
victim of unlawful racial discrimination but declined to reach the con-
stitutional question. They concurred on statutory grounds, 9 that is, Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposed a standard of color
blindness and barred exclusion on the grounds of race, color or na-
tional origin from benefits "under any program or activity receiving
14. Id. at 299.
15. Id. at 314. Justice Powell rejected the first three of the four interests asserted
by Davis as being served by the special admissions program: (1) reducing the under-
representation of minorities in the medical profession; (2) mitigating the effects of gen-
eral societal discrimination; (3) increasing the number of physicians who will practice
in underserved communities; and (4) obtaining the educational benefits arising from an
increased ethnic diversity among the student body.
16. Id. at 316-17.
17. Id. at 318.
18. Id. at 321-24. The Harvard program establishes a pool of qualified applicants
in terms of grades and test scores. It then gives preferences to "equally qualified" ap-
plicants who possess desired non-academic attributes: geographical background, ath-
letic or musical skills, or particular racial or ethnic origins.
For a discussion of the implications of Bakke for law schools, see Lesnick, What
Does Bakke Require of Law Schools: The SALT Board of Governors Statement, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1979).
19. For Justice Powell, the standards under Title VI and the Constitution were
the same. 438 U.S. at 287.
4
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Federal financial assistance."2 At the other antipode, Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall and Blackmun approved the use of race-conscious ad-
missions procedures. They, therefore, joined Justice Powell to form a
five-man majority to reverse the California Supreme Court's order "in-
sofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious
programs in the future."'"
C. Weber
The next test of preferential treatment programs came the follow-
ing year in United Steel Workers of America v. Weber.Y In Weber, a
new on-the-job training program was created by a master collective-
bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the United Steel Workers of
America (USWA) covering fifteen Kaiser plants. The agreement be-
tween Kaiser and USWA was designed to eliminate "a conspicuous
racial imbalance" in Kaiser's craft work force by reserving 50% of the
trainee positions for Blacks until the almost all-white craft work force
was integrated in proportion to the percentage of Blacks in the local
labor force. Both Black and white trainee applicants were selected on
the basis of seniority.
At the Gramercy plant where Brian Weber worked, thirteen train-
ees-seven Blacks and six whites-were accepted from the ranks of
production workers. Brian Weber was not among them, even though
the most junior Black chosen had less seniority. Weber filed a federal
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The record reflected that Davis was a recipient of
federal funds. 438 U.S. at 412.
21. Id. at 326. The net result of these shifting alliances by the Justices was three-
fold: (1) Bakke was admitted to the medical school; (2) the Davis two-track special
admissions program was invalidated as an explicit racial classification; and (3) Davis
was free to go back to the drawing board to reformulate its special admissions
program.
Davis did not in fact revise its special admissions program in the aftermath of
Bakke. A single admissions committee was established to replace the previous dual
system which allowed minorities to be screened by a separate group. A minimum of
fifteen out of a possible thirty points is required in order for the applicant to advance
beyond the first cut in the admissions process. The system awards five points for race
or for severe economic disadvantage, allowing a minority student to reach the second
level of review more easily than a non-minority student. DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, THE
BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 231 (1979).
22. 443 U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 2721 (1979).
7 114:1980
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class action law suit against Kaiser and USWA under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that the Kaiser/USWA plan
illegally discriminated against white workers on the basis of race.?3
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers and unions in the private
sector from voluntarily adopting "race-conscious" affirmative action
plans "to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segre-
gated job categories, ' 2 and concluded that it did not.
The opinion21 by Justice Brennan emphasized the "narrowness" of
the decision. Conceding that the Kaiser/USWA plan violated the lit-
eral language of Title VII, Brennan wrote that the plan was neverthe-
less within the "spirit" of the statute because of the long years of dis-
crimination against Black workers and their worsening position in the
national labor force:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," 110 Cong.
Rec., at 6552 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), constituted the first legisla-
tive prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."
Therefore, the Court concluded, a voluntary affirmative action plan
designed to correct "a manifest racial imbalance" is not inconsistent
with the legislative intention "to open employment opportunity for Ne-
groes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."
In upholding the Kaiser/USWA plan, the Court gave consider-
able weight to the moderate and voluntary2l nature of the affirmative
23. Weber's argument focused on McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976), in which the Court held that whites as well as Blacks are pro-
tected, by Title VII.
24. 443 U.S. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2725.
25. Justice Brennan wrote for himself and Justices White, Stewart, and Mar-
shall. Justice Blackmun concurred. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented. Justices Stevens and Powell did not participate in the decision.
26. 443 U.S. at , 99 S.Ct. at 2728.
27. Id. at 2730, quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
28. As noted by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in dissent, the voluntariness of the Kai-
ser/USWA plan was attenuated by pressures exerted by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance. Id. at 2737-38, n.2. To the extent such a program is truly voluntary, the
Weber decision does not require employers or unions to do anything; it merely permits
6
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action program in terms of its size, scope and duration. First, the craft
training program was small; only thirteen jobs were available. Second,
it did not require the discharge of any white employee in favor of
Blacks. And third, in the words of Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion, the plan "does not afford an absolute preference for blacks,
and .. .it ends when the racial composition of Kaiser's craft work
force matches the racial composition of the local population. It thus
operates as a temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without
attempting to 'maintain' a previously achieved balance.",,
Moderate or not, Justice Rehnquist excoriated the majority for its
approval of the racial quota, which it had refused to uphold in Bakke.
In a caustic seventeen-page dissent, he denounced the majority for its
"Orwellian" interpretation of Title VII and for using tactics reminis-
cent of "escape artists such as Houdini." 0 He insisted that the major-
ity opinion had turned the legislative history on its head in holding that
it permitted voluntary racial discrimination in employment. He con-
demned the racial quota in the Kaiser/USWA plan as a device "de-
structive to the notion of equality. . . .Whether described as 'benign
discrimination' or 'affirmative action,' the racial quota is nonetheless
a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order
to prefer another. . . . [N]o discrimination based on race is
benign. "31
D. Kreps
The most recent manifestation of the preferential treatment issue
those who wish to implement affirmative action plans to do so. It is questionable how
many union negotiators will find it politically feasible to risk antagonizing their own
constituents by adopting plans that benefit the Black minority at the expense of the
white majority. For further ruminations on the practical impact of Weber, see
Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 546, 556 (1979).
29. 443 U.S. at __, 99 S.Ct. at 2734.
30. Id. at 2737. For a critical examination of Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the
legislative intent underlying Title VII, see Dworkin, How To Read The Civil Rights
Act, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 37 (Dec. 20, 1979).
31. Id. at 2753. Chief Justice Burger also dissented on the ground that although
he would be inclined to vote for such an amendment to Title VII were he a member of
Congress, the "statute was conceived and enacted to make discrimination against any
individual illegal. . . ." Id. at 2735.
69 
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is Fullilove v. Kreps,"2 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the 10% minority set-aside provision of the Public Works Em-
ployment Act of 1977,33 rejecting a constitutional challenge by associa-
tions of building contractors and subcontractors. The challenged provi-
sion was an amendment to the Local Public Works Capital
Development and Investment Act of 1976,11 a two billion dollar appro-
priation designed to alleviate unemployment in the economically de-
pressed construction industry. The set-aside operated by prohibiting
grants for any local public works project "unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority
business enterprises. ' 35 A minority business enterprise (MBE) is de-
fined as a business, at least 50% of which is owned by minority group
members-Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, American Indians,
Eskimos and Aleuts.3 6
In evaluating the constitutional validity of the 10% set-aside for
minorities under the fifth amendment,37 the Court, in an opinion that is
less than a model of clarity, chose not to articulate the appropriate
standard of review, stating in dictum that "even under the most exact-
ing standard of review the MBE provision passes constitutional mus-
ter. '38 In reaching this conclusion, the Court gave substantial weight to
the inferred Congressional purpose39 to remedy the effects of past dis-
32. 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)(Supp. 1 1977).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)(Supp. 1 1977).
36. Id.
37. The fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, in order to prevent the anomaly of permitting discrimination by the
federal government that would be prohibited by a state, has held that equal protection
principles are embodied in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
38. 584 F.2d at 603 (footnote omitted).
39. In order to establish the Congressional purpose of rectifying prior discrimi-
nation, the Court referred to statements made by supporters of the amendment in Con-
gress. Statistics prepared by the Department of Commerce and House Committee Re-
ports provided proof of a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the construction
industry. 584 F.2d at 605-06. Having inferred a Congressional finding of past discrimi-
nation, the Court distinguished Bakke, id. at 607, in which Justice Powell emphasized
that "[wle have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members
8
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crimination in the construction industry. The Court acknowledged "the
special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the
effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority
[under §2 of the thirteenth amendment and §5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment] to take appropriate remedial measures."4
Finally, the Court of Appeals considered the effects of the set-
aside on non-minority business enterprises. "[Iln fashioning remedies
for past discrimination, courts must be sensitive to interests which may
be adversely affected by the remedy."' 1 In this examination, the Court
emphasized the small dollar amount of the set-aside in relation to the
total 1977 construction industry expenditure of $170 billion, 2 and con-
cluded that the burden 3 imposed on non-minority business was de
minimis.
The Second Circuit decision in Kreps is currently under review.
Certiorari was granted," and the case was argued before the Supreme
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the ab-
sence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
40. 584 F.2d at 604, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302, n.41. The reliance is not
quite apposite for the Piiblic Works Employment Act is probably an exercise of the
commerce power under Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. During oral argument in the Supreme
Court, however, the government did rely on § 2 of the thirteenth amendment as a
power source. 48 U.S.L.W. 3365 (Dec. 4, 1979).
41. 584 F.2d at 607.
42. The court of appeals reasoned that the 1977 amendment appropriated $4
billion, or about 2.5 percent of the total of nearly $170 billion spent on construction in
the United States that year. The set-aside was for 10 percent of the total grant, or only
.25 percent of funds expended on construction work in the United States. "Further-
more, since according to 1972 census figures minority-owned businesses amount to
only 4.3 percent of the total number of firms in the construction industry, the burden
of being dispreferred with .25 percent of the opportunities ...was thinly spread
among nonminority businesses comprising 96 percent of the industry." Id. at 608 (foot-
note omitted).
43. For a theoretical consideration of the extent of the burden test in equal pro-
tection analysis, see Comment, Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Limits of Congressional
Power to Use Racial Classifications, 74 N.W.U.L. Rnv. 617, 630 (1979).
44. The Court granted certiorari on two questions:
"(1) Is congressional requirement that ten percent of federal grants for local
public works projects be set aside for minority business enterprises constitution-
ally permissible under Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses?
(2) Is minority set-aside program in violation of Title VI of 1964 Civil Rights
Act?"
9
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Court. The questioning at oral argument reflected some skepticism by
the Justices regarding the inherent illimitability of the concept of pref-
erential treatment predicated upon past discrimination. For example,
Justice Rehnquist wanted to know if under that rationale a preference
for Norwegian-Americans would be constitutional." Justice Stewart
similarly asked if a finding of past discrimination would justify a set-
aside for Presbyterians." Justice Stevens questioned whether Republi-
cans could seek affirmative action programs based on past Democratic
majority bias. 7 And other comments from the bench questioned the
adequacy of the Congressional "findings" of past discrimination, sug-
gesting that the 10% set-aside was simply a political decision to spread
the wealth around.48
II. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: THE QUEST
FOR A RATIONALE
A. Who Should Be The Beneficiaries Of Preferential Treatment?
The questions posed by Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens
go directly to the crux of the matter: What is the scope of the proposi-
tion that past discrimination is a proper predicate for preferential
treatment? Which groups would qualify for the preference? Is a show-
ing of past discrimination sufficient, or must there also be present so-
cial, economic or political disadvantage resulting from that discrimina-
tion? The statements of the Justices on these matters are hopelessly
conflicting and reveal no progress toward the development of a cogent
juridical principle.
One of the principal difficulties in arriving at an intellectually co-
herent and ethically satisfactory resolution of the issue of preferential
treatment is the failure of the Court to articulate a rationale rejecting
or justifying the grab bag of racial and ethnic minorities favored by the
various affirmative action programs. In De Funis, Blacks, American
47 U.S.L.W. 3562-63 (Feb. 20, 1979). See note 5 supra.
45. 48 U.S.L.W. at 3366 (Dec. 4, 1979).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Regarding the danger of purely conclusory legislative factfinding of past
discrimination, see Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of "Affirmative Action,"
67 CAL. L. REV. 171, 179 (1979).
1 72
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Indians, Chicanos and Filipinos were favored. In Bakke, the favored
minorities were Blacks, Chicanos, Asians and American Indians and,
in theory, the economically or educationally disadvantaged of any
race.49 In Weber, the affirmative action plan for the craft training pro-
gram was a straightforward quota of 50% Blacks and whites. But in
Kreps, the favored groups included Blacks, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, American Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts."
It is difficult to discern in this potpourri of racial and ethnic
groups any unifying principle. The groups are not similarly situated5'
with respect to either past discrimination or present disability, assum-
ing for the moment, those are the relevant criteria. Orientals, for ex-
ample, are generally well off in terms of economic status52 and educa-
tional attainment." Notwithstanding a long history of virulent
discrimination against the Chinese5' and the Japanese,5 it is difficult to
49. No non-minority disadvantaged students were admitted to Davis under the
special admissions program. 438 U.S. at 276.
50. The inclusion of Eskimos and Aleuts in the definition of minorities is appar-
ently attributable to 42 U.S.C. § 6707(a)(1)(Supp. 1 1977) providing for a 2- percent
set-aside "for grants for public works projects. . . to Indian tribes and Alaska Native
villages."
51. GLAZER, supra note 3, at 74 (1975).
52. The median family income of foreign born and native born (first generation)
Japanese in 1969 was $12,772. The parallel figure for Chinese (including Taiwanese)
was $10,683. Both figures compare quite favorably, after allowing for inflation, with
the 1977 median household income of $14,272 for whites. Based on the rise in the
consumer price index between 1969 and 1977, the income figures for Japanese and
Chinese corrected for inflation would be approximately 66% higher, or $20,118 and
$17,733 respectively. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1978, at 38, Table 43 and at 462, Table 747. [here-
inafter cited as 1978 ABSTRACT].
53. Asian Americans comprise .67% of the general population, but 1.05% of to-
tal college enrollment. Id. at 35, table 38 and at 163, table 265.
54. The Chinese were the first Asians to immigrate to California. A mass immi-
gration made up primarily of laborers from Kwantung province began around 1850
and received impetus from the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill. By 1879 the Chinese
population of California exceeded 111,000. Much of the immigration was the product
of the "coolie trade," an arrangement by which Chinese laborers were imported under
"contracts" that amounted to a form of slavery.
The efficiency of the Chinese laborers, coupled with their large numbers, earned
them the animosity of white labor groups. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886). Vindictive political measures were enacted by the California legislature and
subsequently by Congress.
1 4:98
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regard them as disadvantaged. In addition, there is good reason for
regarding discrimination against Orientals as a regional concern." The
"Spanish-speaking" classification,57 is absurdly over-inclusive. It en-
compasses not only the typically low-income Chicanos 8 and Puerto Ri-
The principle legal manifestation of hostility to the Chinese was the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act of 1882, which suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten
years. It also provided that those who had been in the United States since 1880 could
leave and enter the United States on an identifying certificate. However, the Scott Act
of 1888 voided all outstanding certificates and barred all laborers who had not reen-
tered at the time of the Act's passage. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Act in The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
The Geary Act of 1892 extended the "suspension" for an additional ten years. In
1902, it was converted into permanent exclusion. The Geary Act was also upheld by
the Supreme Court, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
The hostility to the Chinese subsided considerably when the United States entered
World War II as an ally of China. The exclusion acts were repealed in 1943, although
highly restrictive quotas were established. In 1965, the special immigration restrictions
pertaining to Asians were abolished. See BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
69-72 (1972).
55. The Japanese began arriving in the United States in large numbers about
1890. Anti-Chinese feeling was very high, and the hostility was easily transferred to the
new Asian arrivals. The victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 aroused fears of a
"yellow peril" in the United States.
California agriculture was a principal point of confrontation. Japanese efficiency
stimulated the enactment in 1913 of the Alien Land Laws in California. Many states
followed suit.
Immigration policy also reflected anti-Japanese sentiment. The Quota Act of 1924
excluded "aliens ineligible to citizenship;" the Japanese did not gain the right to citi-
zenship until 1952. World War II added obvious stresses culminating in the removal of
the Japanese from the West Coast. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See BELL supra note 54, at
72-76.
56. More than one-third of the 591,000 Japanese live in California, with another
third in Hawaii. Similarly, nearly 40% of the Chinese live in California, with Hawaii
and New York accounting for an additional 35%. 1978 ABSTRACT at 35, table 39.
57. Statistics for the "Spanish" category are generally not broken down into the
constituent national origins. The 1977 median household income for Spanish families
was $10,647, compared to $14,272 for whites and $8,422 for blacks. Only 8.4% of
Spanish families have median incomes below $3000 per year, compared to 6.3% of the
white families and 15.3% of the black families. Id. at 462, table 747.
58. The Chicanos are of Mexican origin and comprise the largest single group of
Spanish-surnamed people in the United States. About 7,000,000 Chicanos live in the
Southwest-, BELL, supra note 54, at 76-81.
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cans, but the relatively affluent and upwardly mobile Cubans, who as
recent arrivals have no history of discrimination and who were given
refugee assistance59 in the flight from Castro's Cuba.
It is clear that Blacks are the largest,"0 poorest,61 and among the
least well educated" of any of the disadvantaged groups typically in-
cluded in affirmative action plans. No other group in America, with the
arguable exception of the American Indian," has a comparable history
of systematic racial oppression and resulting social and economic infer-
iority.6 ' "At every point from birth to death, the impact of the past is
reflected in the still disfavored position of the Negro."6
B. Standards For Preferential Treatment
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, the racial and ethnic
59. See 22 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976).
60. The 1970 census reflects a total United States population of 203,212,000. Of
that number, 177,749,000 are whites; 22,580,000 are Blacks; 793,000 are Indians;
591,000 are Japanese; 435,000 are Chinese; and 343,000 are Filipino. Spanish-speaking
persons are included in the white category. Id. at 35, table 38.
61. See note 57 supra.
62. Blacks comprise 11.11% of the total population, but only 6.95% of college
enrollment. Whites-are enrolled in proportion to their percentage of the population.
1978 ABSTRACT at 35, table 38 and at 163, table 265.
63. The brutal, at times genocidal, policies of the American government with
respect to the Indian tribes cannot be denied. However, for purposes of this article,
there are significant practical and legal considerations justifying consideration of Indi-
ans as sui generis. The physical concentration of the Indians on reservations in the
Western States, their limited numbers (793,000), and their unique statutory, adminis-
trative, and treaty ,status renders it difficult, if not impossible, to fit their situation
within the analytical framework relevant to preferential treatment. In Morton v. Man-
cari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974), the Supreme Court acknowledged "the unique legal
status of Indian tribes under federal law and . . . the plenary power of Congress,
based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian ward' status. .. ."
The Court also cited Title 25 of the United States Code as further evidence of the
unique historical and legal position of the Indian tribes. Id. at 552. See also note 135
infra.
64. See generally Lewis, Parry and Riposte to Gregor's "The Law, Social Sci-
ence, and School Segregation: An Assessment," DEFACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 115 (0. Schroeder, Jr. & D. Smith eds. 1965).
65. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396. For a further discussion of the disadvantaged status
of Black Americans, see Justice Marshall's opinion, id. at 395-96. See also THE STATE
OF BLACK AMERICA 1979 (National Urban League, Inc. 1979).
14:1980
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groups selected for inclusion in affirmative action plans are not simi-
larly situated. Nevertheless, two common factors are apparent: a his-
tory of discrimination and/or a presently disadvantaged status. These
factors are frequently identified by writers as the basis of affirmative
action. For example, prior discrimination corresponds roughly to a
compensatory rationale and present disadvantage to a distributive ra-
tionale, two of the four justifications for racial preference identified by
Paul Brest.6
The distributive rationale "holds that it is prima facie unjust for
any racial or ethnic group in our society to be appreciably less well off
than other groups," 7 regardless of the reason for the inequality. Its use
is thus independent of a showing of prior discrimination." The com-
pensatory rationale, on the other. hand, focuses on past injustices and
would justify compensatory treatment or reparations69 for historical
66. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 544-45 (1975). The
preventive rationale is primarily concerned with institutional self-preservation, i.e., to
avoid a charge of de jure discrimination. Cf. Weber, 99 S.Ct. at 2730-32 (Justice
Blackmun's opinion discussing the "arguable violations" theory); and 99 S.Ct. at 2737-
38, n.2 (Justice Rehnquist's questioning of the voluntariness of the Kaiser program).
The instrumental rationale is concerned with institutional or societal improvement. It
is exemplified by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke in which he accepted educational
enrichment resulting from ethnic diversity of the student body as a compelling govern-
mental interest.
67. See BREST, supra note 66, at 545.
68. A distributive rationale is the basis of all anti-poverty programs, which are
the most efficacious way to address the problem of have-not groups. Payments to or
preference for an entire race or ethnic group which is poor as a race or group would
necessarily be over-inclusive and under-inclusive. For example, Blacks would be com-
pensated, rich or poor, while whites would not. On the other hand, there are substan-
tial savings in administrative costs to be realized from using race as a proxy for other
characteristics, such as poverty. See generally Posner, The De Funis Case and the Con-
stitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
69. The compensatory rationale is analogous to the shifting of losses from victim
to wrongdoer which forms the basis of our civil justice system. As applied to racial or
ethnic groups, the compensatory rationale is similar to the payment of reparations for
injustices committed by one nation or race against another. The outstanding contempo-
rary example is the payment of $820 million by the government of West Germany to
the government of Israel in 1967 as reparations for the Holocaust.
On May 4, 1969, James Forman interrupted the Sunday morning service at River-
side Church in New York City and read the Black Manifesto which demanded that the
churches and synagogues pay $500 million as "a beginning of the reparations due us as
people who have been exploited and degraded, brutalized, killed and persecuted." Birr-
1 76
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wrongs, regardless of present disadvantage. The compensatory ratio-
nale was given short shrift by Justice Powell in Bakke.70
Intuitively, neither rationale standing alone seems sufficient to jus-
tify preferential treatment based on race. But a combination of the two
rationales was relied upon by the Court to validate a state law prefer-
ring women over men. In Kahn v. Shevin,71 the Supreme Court upheld
preferential tax status for women because of prior discrimination and
their inferior economic position. Nevertheless, in Bakke Justice Powell
rejected the analogy to preferential treatment based on sex because ra-
cial and ethnic preference "presents far more complex and intractable
problems . .. . Fearing to tread upon the slippery slope, he was un-
willing "to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm
suffered by various minority groups."73 He asserted that there would be
"no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit"74 preferen-
tial treatment and that the rankings of minority groups "simply does
not lie within the judicial competence. .. .
Thus, the thrust of Justice Powell's position is that "no principled
basis" can be found to justify preferential treatment even for those
KER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 4 (1973). See also SCHUCHTER, REPARA-
TIONS (1970).
70. 438 U.S. at 306, n.43. Undoubtedly, there are serious ethical problems inher-
ent in the concept of reparations and its practical administration. How are victims to
be identified? If payment is made to the group as a whole, then non-victims will be
gifted with a windfall. In addition, many persons in the "majority" have no connection
with the historical wrongs. These and other issues are explored in sophisticated detail
in GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE: Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY, (1978). See also
Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 427 (1979). Professor Cala-
bresi is one of the few advocates of a reparations rationale for the solution of the
Bakke issue. See note 135 infra.
71. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In Kahn, Justice Douglas relied upon the traditional
economic disadvantages imposed upon women in the marketplace and the fact that
women's median annual income was only 57.9% that of men in 1972. Id. at 353. Other
cases have sustained sex-based preferences on a compensatory rationale. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
72. 438 U.S. at 303.
73. Id. at 296-97.
74. Id. at 296.
75. Id. at 297. Justice Powell quoted from Justice Douglas' dissent in De Funis
that "[t]he reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members of selected
minority groups is fraught with . . . dangers, for one must immediately determine
which groups are to receive such favored treatment and which are to be ex-
cluded. . . ." Id. at 297, n.37.
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groups who have been historically oppressed and who are currently dis-
advantaged. The remainder of this article will attempt to demonstrate
that Mr. Justice Powell's conclusion is significantly mistaken insofar as
it lumps together all racial and ethnic groups for the purpose of consti-
tutional analysis. Without resorting to the compensatory or distributive
rationale, or to any extra-constitutional justification, a neutral princi-
ple78 for preferential treatment for Blacks can be anchored in the con-
crete foundation of constitutional legitimacy.77 All that is required is a
recognition that the Constitution and laws have not been color blind
and that they have a special mission to fulfill with respect to the Eman-
cipation of Blacks.
III. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF BLACKS IN THE
FORGING OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
THE UNCOMPLETED EMANCIPATION
The history of Black slavery, segregation, and discrimination was
summarized with great eloquence by Mr. Justice Marshall in the sepa-
rate opinion in Bakke:
Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this coun-
try in chains to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and
thrust into bondage for forced labor, the slave was deprived of all legal
rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could be sold away from
his family and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming
him was not a crime.78  I
The advent of the Constitution did not undermine slavery; on the
contrary, the acknowledgment and protection of slavery were made ex-
plicit in the Constitution. 79 The Supreme Court itself, beginning with
76. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 15 (1959).
77. See Wisotsky, Beyond Legitimacy, 33 U.MIAMI L. REV. 173 (1979) for a
general discussion of the concept of legitimacy in Supreme Court adjudication.
78. 438 U.S. at 387-88. The American slave trade is thought to have begun in
Jamestown in 1619. "By 1776, there were about 500,000 Negroes held in slavery and
indentured servitude in the United States. Nearly one of every six persons in the coun-
try was a slave." Rep. of Nat. Comm. on Civil Disorders, Rejection and Protest: An
Historical Sketch 95 (1968), cited in BELL, supra note 54, at 1.
79. Article I, § 2 treated each slave as 3/5ths of a person for purposes of appor-
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the Marshall Court,"0 reinforced the institution of slavery in several
early decisions. The most infamous case, Dred Scott v. Sanford,"1 held
that the Missouri Compromise prohibiting slavery in the portion of the
Louisiana purchase territory north of the Missouri River was unconsti-
tutional because it deprived slave owners of their property without due
process of law. In rejecting Dred Scott's claim of citizenship, Chief
Justice Taney wrote that Negroes were not intended to be included as
citizens under the Constitution but were "regarded as beings of an in-
ferior order . . . altogether unfit to associate with the white race, ei-
ther in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respecf .... "82
The status of the Negro as property and as a non-citizen was offi-
cially transformed by the Civil War and by the post-war constitutional
amendments. The thirteenth amendment abolished slavery and involun-
tary servitude; the fourteenth amendment conferred citizenship upon
the freedmen; and the fifteenth amendment guaranteed the right to
vote, at least in theory. But the promise of Reconstruction and the
Civil War Amendments was nullified by the systematic enslavement of
the freedmen:
The Southern States took the first steps to re-enslave the Negroes. Im-
mediately following the end of the Civil War, many of the provisional
legislatures passed Black Codes, similar to the Slave Codes, which,
among other things, limited the rights of Negroes to own or rent prop-
erty and permitted imprisonment for breach of employment contracts.
Over the next several decades, the South managed to disenfranchise the
Negroes in spite of the Fifteenth Amendment by various techniques, in-
cluding poll taxes, deliberately complicated balloting processes, property
and literacy qualifications, and finally the white primary.,
In every other area of social, political and economic life the freed-
tioning representatives and taxes among the states. Article I, § 9 specifically denied
Congress the power to end the slave trade until the year 1808. Article IV, § 2, cl.3, the
fugitive slave clause, required that a slave who escaped to another state must be re-
turned upon the demand of his master.
80. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall Court and the Legiti-
mation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532 (1969).
81. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
82. Id. at 407.
83. 438 U.S. at 390 (opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall).
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men were degraded, humiliated, and relegated to a position of inferi-
ority. But most of all, it was the absolute inability of the law to protect
their personal safety that was responsible for the subjugation of Blacks.
Starting immediately after the Civil War and easing for a short period
during Reconsturuction when federal troops were present in the South,
a reign of white supremacist terror was carried on by the Ku Klux
Klan, the White Camellias, and other secret societies."4 By intimida-
tion, burnings, beatings and lynchings-a reign of terror that could jus-
tifiably be called an American pogrom-the freedmen were wantonly
victimized and brutalized. Approximately 5,000 lynchings have been
documented.8 5
The physical degradation and persecution of Blacks was reflected
in the law by physical separation of the races in public accomodations
and virtually all other aspects of life. The Supreme Court itself contrib-
uted to this process of segregation by creating the state action doctrine
in the Civil Rights Cases,"8 which had the legal effect of immunizing
"private" racial discrimination from constitutional scrutiny and the
psychological effect of encouraging the South in its oppression of
Blacks. The coup de grace was delivered in the Court's "separate-but-
equal" ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson.s7 The enforced separation of the
races in railway cars upheld in Plessy was accurately interpreted in Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion to mean that "colored citizens are
so far inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens." 8 The effect of the Plessy decision
was to encourage the Southern States to expand the scope of the Jim
Crow laws to include segregated residential areas, parks, hospitals,
theatres, waiting rooms and bathrooms."
84. The lawlessness was so vindictive and destructive that Congress was moved
to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and related civil rights statutes now codified as
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq.
85. See BELL, supra note 54, at 857.
86. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
87. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
88. id. at 560.
89. Jim Crow laws also infected the legal system. In the South, there were segre-
gated jury boxes, witness docks and even a Jim Crow Bible for colored witnesses to
kiss. 438 U.S. at 393 (opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall), citing C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 68 (3d ed. 1974).
These pernicious practices were not confined to the South. Segregation spread to
the Northern States and even to the practices of the federal government. "Under Presi-
1 80 4:1980 1
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The enforced segregation of the races continued into the middle of the
20th century. In both World Wars, Negroes were for the most part con-
fined to separate military units; it was not until 1948 that an end to
segregation in the military was ordered by President Truman. And the
history of the exclusion of Negro children from white public schools is
too well known and recent to require repeating here. That Negroes were
deliberately excluded from public graduate and professional
schools-and thereby denied the opportunity to become doctors, law-
yers, engineers, and the like-is also well established."
The first 'major blow to segregation-to separate-but-equal as a
constitutional doctrine-did not transpire until nearly a century after
the Civil War. In Brown v. Board of Education,9 the Supreme Court
held that the segregation of public school children on the basis of race
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."92 The Court concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal."93 Brown was rapidly extended in a series of
per curiam decisions to a full range of public facilities such as
beaches,94 buses,95 golf courses" and parks.97 The pernicious separate-
but-equal doctrine of Plessy was interred. Blacks were no longer to be
excluded by law from public facilities used by whites.
Of course, the process of desegregation of public facilities, particu-
dent Wilson, the federal government began to require segregation in government build-
ings; desks of Negro employees were curtained off; separate bathrooms and separate
tables in the cafeterias were provided; and even the galleries of the Congress were
segregated." Id. at 394.
90. Id.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id. at 495. The companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
has special symbolic importance in that segregation of the races by law was practiced
in the capital city of the United States until the Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional.
94. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955).
95. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affg .142 F.Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.
1956).
96. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating and remanding 223
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
97. New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958), aff'g 252
F.2d 122 (5th Cir: 1958).
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larly schools,98 was not accomplished without a struggle and
violent resistance. There were freedom marches, demonstrations in
the streets and elsewhere,99 sit-ins at lunch counters, 10 stand-ins at vot-
ing registration centers. The nightly news in the early sixties was a ka-
leidoscope of villainy: Bull Connor's men using cattle prods and high
pressure hoses on demonstrators; Lester Maddox chasing Black cus-
tomers with his pick handles; George Wallace standing in the school-
house door; Orval Faubus at Little Rock defying the mandate of
Brown v. Board of Education.101 And there were killings: four young
girls bombed to death while attending church services in Birmingham,
Alabama; Viola Luzzo, the civil rights worker from Detroit gunned
down by three Klansmen in Alabama; James Chaney, Andrew Good-
man, and Michael Schwerner shot in the night and buried in shallow
Mississippi graves; Medgar Evers, NAACP field secretary, shot by an
assassin while marching for freedom; and finally Martin Luther King,
assassinated by James Earl Ray in Memphis, Tennessee in 1968. Many
were martyred in the Civil Rights Movement.1 12
The second phase of the modern Black Emancipation began with
the intervention of Congress. After a decade of virtual torpor on civil
rights issues (excepting only voting rights)" 3 while under the domina-
98. "A decade after Brown, only 1.17 percent of black children in the eleven
states of the old Confederacy attended school with whites." BARRON & DIENES, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 607 (1975). A variety of evasive tactics, inge-
nious and disingenuous, for avoiding desegregation was utilized: pupil assignment laws,
Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 921 (1957); student transfer plans, Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683
(1963); freedom of choice plans, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968); and even the closing of the public schools, Griffin v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). The close-down maneu-
ver was also employed to avoid desegregation of public swimming pools in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
99. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
100. See, e.'g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
101. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Faubus' defiance caused President
Eisenhower to mobilize federal troops in order to effect the admission of Negro stu-
dents to Central High School.
102. See EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1000-03 (Student ed. 1967).
103. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976).
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tion of Southern Congressmen vested with seniority and therefore pow-
erful committee chairmanships, Congress was roused to take legislative
action. Under the pressure of international condemnation and domestic
dissent, the latter brought to a climax by the People's March on Wash-
ington, Congress broke through the obstruction of racist fillibusters
and enacted the first modem comprehensive civil rights law, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.104 Continued Southern denial of Black citizenship
necessitated the Voting Rights Act of 1965,15 and a series of broaden-
ing amendments. After the adoption of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
Johnson Administration proposals for additional omnibus civil rights
legislation were repeatedly blocked in the Senate."' Once again, dra-
matic political developments-in particular, the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.-broke the impasse and Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.107
This abbreviated review of the Civil Rights Movement and of con-
gressional civil rights legislation is intended to underscore the extent to
which the American legal system has been preoccupied with issues of
slavery, segregation, and their aftermath, the extent to which special
consideration of Blacks is an institutionalized feature of our laws. This
leads to a second point. The legacy of white supremacy has been a
legacy of subjugation, persecution, and degradation which has uniquely
burdened the Black race. As Mr. Justice Marshall put the matter:
The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not
just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the
history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as
inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.'
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976); and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(e) (1976). The act lim-
ited the use of exclusionary voter tests (Title I), outlawed discrimination in places of
public accomodation (Title II), authorized suits by the Attorney General to desegre-
gate public facilities (Title III), provided for the desegregation of public education (Ti-
tle IV), banned discrimination in federally funded programs (Title VI), and prohibited
discrimination in employment by employers, employment agencies, and labor unions
(Title VII).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
106. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 905 (9th ed. 1975).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Perhaps the most important provision was Title
VIII, prohibiting discrimination, inter alia, in the sale or rental of property.
108. 438 U.S. at 400.
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The question now becomes one of determining the legal significance of
that enduring mark.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF NEGRO
FREEDOM: THE LEGITIMIZING PRINCIPLE
In Bakke, Justice Powell acknowledged the original interpretation
of the equal protection clause, which viewed its "one pervading pur-
pose" as securing "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him." ' 9 But, he argued, the late
nineteenth century wave of European immigration transformed the
United States into "a Nation of minorities. . . .As the Nation filled
with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually
extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimi-
nation." 110 It was "no longer possible," Justice Powell concluded, "to
peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for
equality of one racial minority." '' "The clock of our liberties . . . can-
not be turned back to 1868.1112
Although Justice Powell's rhetoric is seductive, his conclusion is
predicated upon a false dichotomy: Either the equal protection clause
protects all groups equally, or there is "no principled basis" for choos-
ing one group over another for preferential treatment. But Justice Pow-
ell's premise may be rejected. It is a judicial value preference, of
course. It is not historically compelled; nor does it reflect sufficient sen-
sitivity to the problems of "a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery
and racial discrimination.""' More fundamentally, Justice Powell's
universe of discourse is unduly restrictive in its exclusive focus on the
contours of the equal protection clause. The constitutional dimensions
of the issue are broader.
The inadequacies of Justice Powell's analysis are revealed by com-
parison to the force and clarity of Arthur Kinoy's 1967 essay, The
109. Id. at 291, quoting Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
110. Id. at 292.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 295.
113. Id. at 294.
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Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom.11 4 Kinoy's argument, focusing
on the debate between Justices Bradley and Harlan in the Civil Rights
Cases, persuasively establishes that the Civil War Amendments em-
body a continuing national commitment to complete the process of
Emancipation begun in the Civil War.
Kinoy explains that in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court had articu-
lated, largely in dictum, "a full blown legal and constitutional theory
designed to serve as a national justification for the preservation of the
institution of slavery."1 '5 That rationale was the non-citizenship of
Blacks, which was justified because they were "a subordinate and infer-
ior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race.""'
After the Civil War, the Dred Scott opinion was directly repudiated by
ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The
effect of these amendments was to free the Negro "from any discrimi-
nation by reason of race or color in the exercise of rights or privileges
hitherto enjoyed by white men .. .""7 Yet, the nature of the rights
created by the Civil War Amendments was not merely to be free of
oppression by the states, but ,as an essential attribute of the newly con-
ferred citizenship "to be free from the stigma of inferiority implicit in
the institution of slavery .. ."Is
Of course, that degree of equality was antithetical to the political
realities of the time. The dominant fact of political life was the Com-
promise of 1877, a genteel phrase for the sell-out of the freedmen,
which was accomplished by the withdrawal of federal troops from the
South in exchange for southern Democrat support in the deadlocked
House of Representatives for the election of Republican candidiate
Rutherford B. Hayes as President."' This Compromise represented the
abandonment "in the political arena . . . of national responsibility for
the enforcement of the newly created rights of the race of freedmen.' ' 2
Justice Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases was the constitu-
tional counterpart of that abandonment, shifting the focus of responsi-
114. 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967).
115. Id. at 391.
116. Id., quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856)
(footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 394.
118. Id. at 395.
119. The Compromise of 1877 is pithily summarized by Kinoy, id. at 396, n.31.
120. Id. at 396 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted).
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bility back to the individual Southern States. Thus, Justice Bradley ar-
gued that the fourteenth amendment was essentially negative in
character, prohibiting state denials of Black equality, but vesting no
corrective power in Congress over "private" discrimination. This is the
etiology of the state action doctrine which was used to strike down the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.
More fundamental and more enduring in its destructive impact
was the denial of the special mission of the Civil War Amendments to
ameliorate the oppressed condition of the freedmen:
Once he had b6en granted citizenship the freedman's right not to be dis-
criminated against by reason of his race had no special constitutional
significance distinct from any citizen's right not to be discriminated
against in the equal enjoyment of rights and privileges. Like the ordinary
citizen's right under the laws of a state to be treated equally with any
other citizen, the freedman must now look in the first instance for pro-
tection in the exercise of these rights to the original source of the "ordi-
nary" civil rights of all citizens, the individual state. It is time, said the
Bradley Court in 1883, to eliminate any preferred status for the
freedman.'
It is almost as if the shield of the Civil War Amendments were
transformed into a sword against the mythical "preferred status" of
the freedmen. Kinoy labels this transformation "a rather extraordinary
piece of legal legerdemain." '
Discrimination against the freedman in all areas of public life had be-
come, by this skillful process of judicial reasoning, wholly merged into
the general phenomenon of any discrimination against any class or
group of citizens. The problem legally as well as politically was no
longer to be verbalized in terms of the special and unique national re-
sponsibility of the elimination of the influences of an entire social and
economic institution-human slavery-from the life of the country.' 2
But the right of the Negro not to be discriminated against "is not iden-
tical to the general right of all citizens not to be arbitrarily discrimi-
121. Id. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted).
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id. at 402.
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nated against,"'' 4 and it is not an "ordinary civil right."
It is a nationally created right essential to the establishment of a para-
mount national objective, the elevation of the black man from the status
of slave and inferior being to the status of a free and equal member of
the political community of the United States, an elevation without which
the grant of citizenship to the Negro would become meaningless. For, as
Justice Harlan prophetically warned, unless this nationally created right
was protected by the national government the race of freedmen would
inevitably sink back into a "second-class" citizenship equivalent in es-
sential respects to the former status of "inferiority" and "degradation"
which was the legal and social hallmark of the slave society.'1
And that is exactly what happened. The withdrawal of federal
troops from the South, the enactment of the Black Codes, the spread
of segregationist practices to the North, made a mockery even of Jus-
tice Bradley's grudging grant of formal equality under the law. Instead
of steady progress toward the goal of Emancipation of the freedmen,
the next ninety years were spent confronting the racial animus of slav-
ery and the Civil War in the streets and the courtrooms, while Blacks
remained in a conditon of political, social, economic, and legal
inferiority.
Although he does not explicitly consider the issue of affirmative
action in his 1967 essay, the power of Kinoy's analysis is remarkable.
First, it clarifies the nature and meaning of the Civil War Amend-
ments, demonstrating them to be an overriding national commitment
to elevate the status of the former slaves to a position of full equality in
society. "Until this change in status is achieved the national objective
remains unfulfilled and the national responsibility for its accomplish-
ment remains in force."' 2'
Simultaneously, Kinoy's broader conceptualization of the issue
succeeds in developing the sought-after neutral jural principle that le-
gitimates affirmative action. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more
neutral principle, assuming such a thing exists at all,' 2 than the force
of the national commitment embodied in the extraordinary majorities
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 403 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 404.
127. See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661, 671 (1960).
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required to ratify three constitutional amendments in five years. Ki-
noy's Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom thus offers a principled
justification for affirmative action for Blacks. By simply acknowledging
the special mission of the Civil War Amendments and the national fail-
ure to complete the Emancipation begun over a century ago, we are
liberated from the intractable constitutional dilemmas so widely
thought to be inherent in preferential treatment. More than a century
after the Civil War, the status of Blacks remains inferior; the badges of
slavery have not been eradicated. As recently as 1968, the Supreme
Court obseved that racial discrimination against Blacks is a '."relic of
slavery."' 8 Substantive equality has not been achieved, nor is it likely
in light of a century of post-Civil War oppression to come about with-
out "reverse discrimination."
CONCLUSION
The acceptance of the duty to complete Emancipation as the oper-
ative juridical principle justifying affirmative action will not put an end
to the difficult issues which will arise in the course of implementation.
Foremost among these is the allocation of benefits and burdens-which
Blacks shall be benefitted and which whites burdened by preferential
treatment?' In addition, the abandonment of fuzzy thinking (or expe-
diency) 3° reflected in a nebulous concept of affirmative action for racial
and ethnic minorities generally in favor of one for Blacks only 3' is
128. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
129. DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 21, at 260 titled their last chapter "A
Choice of Victims." One writer suggests that "[tihe interest of blacks in achieving
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites." Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). Professor Bell also discusses the pressures militating
toward social class divisions among whites on the issue of affirmative action in Bell,
Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 3 (1979).
130. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
131. Professor Calabresi, supra note 70, at 432, in his proposed reparations solu-
tion to the issue posed by the Bakke case, would limit "benign quotas" to Blacks "and
perhaps to American Indians. . . ." Professor Sedler, less attentive to principle, offers
no justification for the cognitive leap from Professor Kinoy's Constitutional Right of
Negro Freedom to the inclusion of "Puerto Ricans, Chicanos and Native Americans"
in racially preferential admissions programs. Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the
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certain to be politically troublesome. It would require, for example, the
invalidation of the set-aside in Kreps.32
Consideration of these and related questions has been avoided by
the Court because it has failed to undertake the antecedent task of
developing an analytical framework for the adjudication of affirmative
action cases.11 Thus, the failure of the Bakke opinions (excepting Jus-
tice Marshall's) is their failure to confront squarely and cleanly the
issue of race in light of the national "legacy of slavery and racial dis-
crimination,"'' 34 and to use the decision as another opportunity to fulfill
the Court's continuing mission of national consciousness-raising on
matters of racial justice. It could fulfill that mission most effectively by
a judicial acknowledgement of the truth' about American racism.
Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 329, n.3, and 365-68 (1977).
132. The invalidation of the minorities set-aside in Kreps would be required
under the incompleted Emancipation analysis suggested here. However, it remains pos-
sible that the Court could uphold the set-aside under the plenary power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The latter decisions, of
course, were predicated on the injury to commerce resulting from racial discrimination
against Blacks.
An alternative theory for upholding the Kreps set-aside is a Congressional affirma-
tive action power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, suggested by Comment,
supra note 43, at 635-37.
133. Although Weber was correctly decided, it deals with benign quotas in the
private sector and does not, therefore, address the more prickly issue of publicly
funded "reverse discrimination," as in Bakke.
134. 438 U.S. at 294. The failure is also ironic in view of the fact that Justice
Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, attempts to jus-
tify the Davis special admissions program almost exclusively in terms of the history of
discrimination against Blacks. Id. at 324 et seq.
135. It has taken almost eighty-five years and an unprecedented upsurge of
the descendants of the freedmen for the nation to begin to face frankly the
extraordinary fact of American history-that the "universal freedom"
which the Emancipation Amendment was supposed to enact was never
achieved; that the social institution of slavery was never fully uprooted;
that its badges and indicia continued to mark the Negro with the hallmark
of slavery, the stamp of an "inferior race." Neither the Court nor the
nation could face this reality. For some it was an evil lived with but never
discussed; for some it was an unfortunate but inevitable concomitant of
American society; for others it was a welcomed reestablishment of a for-
mer way of life. But all shared one common unspoken agreement-the
reality was not to be discussed; the phenomenon was not to be named; the
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unpleasant truth could not be faced. It can be argued, as the first Justice
Harlan might well have argued, that this strange and deep-seated reluc-
tance to face the reality of the incompleted Emancipation lies not only at
the root of the complicated conceptual problems which still beset the
Court in interpreting the scope and thrust of the Wartime Amendments
but, in a more important sense, remains at the heart of the most difficult
unresolved problems of contemporary national life.
Kinoy, supra note 114, at 414.
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